Legislative voting has long been a subject central to modern American political science. Recently, economists have also become active in this field of study. Over the years a number of alternative models have been proposed to explain legislative voting, and a rough consensus has developed on the identity of the major determinants of voting (Kingdon, 1977) . In most models ideology plays a role in determining the legislator's voting pattern. The ensuing pages attempt to convince the reader both that there is something wrong with the way ideology has usually been measured and that our procedure constitutes a substantially improved measure for ideology. The argument of this article is consistent with virtually any theoretical model of legislative behavior which gives ideology a place.
To illustrate and test our procedure, it will be necessary to apply our argument within the context of a specific theoretical approach to legislative voting. Our applications are to models that picture the representative's voting act as a political act in which a career politician attempts to further his security, and his stature, by strategically choosing how to vote.' Such a model assumes that the individual legislator is motivated by whatever gives electoral, or more broadly, political, securit^.^ But such a political view of the legislator is incomplete, for legislators also have personal views and values which enter into their voting decisions (cf. Wittman, 1977) .' Normally legislative voting is seen as a function of the representative's political and ideological constraints, i.e., the representative's party, the 'One can point to some of the alternative models put forward in the congressional voting literature. For example, it has been suggested that representatives vote by taking cues from their colleagues, and in particular it has been shown that representatives tend to vote with both their state colleagues and others with whom they find themselves in ideological agreement (Kingdon, 1977; Weisberg, 1978) . Other variables that are often considered stem from the Washington, or more specifically, the legislative environment and characteristics of the legislator's electoral coalition (Kushner, 1975; Markus, 1974) . Such analyses may indeed be correct and not inconsistent with what we are proposing. Quite the contrary, some shall be shown merely to require a more complex system of equations for tests.
2A number of analysts have argued this position with varying degrees of dissent from its assumptions. See, for example, Chappell (1981a, b) , Kau and Rubin (1979a, comments. b), Mayhew (1974) , and Silberman and Durden (1976) .
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socioeconomic (or political) characteristics of the on, let's say, labor issues, one could estimate legislator's constituents and other supporters, and COPE6 scores as a function of the individual's the legislator's own ideology.' In many of these party (Pi), district (Di), personal position within studies, there appears to be considerable agree-the legislature (LPi), and ideology (I,) . ment on how to measure ideology. Ideology is Now COPE scores are highly correlated with usually operationalized by the use of one or such standard measures of ideology as the ratings another of a number of "ratings" by pressure bestowed on members of Congress by the Amerigroups. (See, for example, Bernstein & Horn, cans for Democratic Action (ADA) and by the 1981; Chappell, 1981a, b; Kalt, 1981 Kalt, , 1982 ; Ken-conservative pressure group, the Americans for ski & Kenski, 1980; Lopreato & Smoller, 1978; Constitutional Action (ACA) .' Further, since the MacRae, 1970; Matthews, 1960.) Our argument is ADA score, or another proxy for ideology, is not for or against any one particular paradigm, simultaneously determined with the dependent nor with the inclusion of ideology as a determi-variable (COPE), other problems may follow. For nant of the incumbent's voting patterns, but example, using ADA as a measure for ideology rather with the method used to measure ideol~gy.~ could cause the other variables to be counted Pressure group "ratings" are usually calculated simply as the percentage of the time the legislator voted "with" the pressure group on a specific subset of roll call votes during a particular session. Thus, part of the incumbent's voting record is used as an indicator of ideology. Ideology is then used to explain voting on some other matters. This method creates difficulties of interpretation because we are explaining a set of votes (e.g., on labor issues) by a (perhaps disjoint) second set of votes which are taking place over the same period of time and are theoretically simultaneously determined by the same factors. More generally, the measure of the independent variable, ideology, is itself explained by the same variables as is the dependent variable. For example, if one were interested in explaining voting behavior 'There is, however, a tradition, especially in the public choice school, to discount (totally) the personal values of the politicians (e.g., Downs, 1957) . The results reported in the fourth part of this article can be seen as a (disconfirming) test of this hypothesis.
'The factors that are indicated are usually part of the explanatory variables utilized in legislative voting studies. See, for example, Lopreato and Smoller (1978) . Note that it could be that voting is not determined by district characteristics, but rather only by those elements (of or beyond the district) which are selected to be in the legislator's coalition. Note that the coalition would filter both the voters and the interest groups which support the legislator. This is the implication of the work of Markus (1974) and Kushner (1975) and is supported by various public choice models such as that by Oppenheimer (1975) .
JUsually the personal ideology of a legislator is taken to be reflected in the ratings of that legislator by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). But the indices of various groups are highly correlated with each other (which they should be, theoretically, if there is an overall model governing voting behavior) (Poole, 1981) . We accept the usual convention of ideology along the liberal-conservative dimension. There are, of course, other dimensions which could be defined. The arguments presented in this article are adaptive.
twice-once directly and once through their role in determining ADA. Thus, it is obvious that while the ADA rating (ADA) is correlated with I (and hence a possible proxy for I), it is also correlated with everything else in the equation, giving rise to problems of extreme multicollinearity (and its associated problems-large standard errors in parameter estimates and unreliable tests of significance). Thus, Fiorina (1979) noted, in a critique of an article that used this practice:
The explanatory variable, liberalism, is measured by the Americans for Democratic Action index. Since the roll call votes that compose the latter are presumably functions of party and constituency as well as ideological influences, it is difficult to treat the summed score as a measure of liberalism alone but . . . (the authors) show no great concern over this (p. 50).
Therefore, when the researcher correlates (for example) an individual's ADA rating with his or her voting on some other issues and reports that correlation as indicating the role of ideology in the incumbent's voting, the ideology is given weights which, at least, are noninterpretable and probably are vastly overstated. Other variables are also assigned peculiar weights.
6Here COPE is the AFL-CIO's rating of the legislator. These scores indicate the percentage of the time that the legislator voted "with" the interests of the AFL-CIO on issues selected by the unions.
'For example, Kau and Rubin (1979a, p. 369 ) report the correlations as follows for 1973: r(COPE,ADA) = 35, r(COPE,ACA) = -.89, and r(ACA,ADA) = -.90.Similarly, in our data (see the third and fourth sections below), r(COPE,ADA) = .86.
"idker and Henning's (1967) problem was that one of their independent variables incorporated the effects of air pollution on property values, the item they wished to measure. Johannes and McAdams develop a residualized ADA variable to measure the representative's deviation from the district's ideological position, as measured by its pro-McGovern vote in 1972.
Indeed, researchers have noticed in their studies that personal ideology was "weighing in" heavily, and that their findings did not reflect normally perceived wisdom (e.g., Bernstein & Horn, 1981; Dunlop & Allen, 1976; Kenski & Kenski, 1980) . Theoretically, utilizing ADA as a direct measure of personal ideology double-enters all the district characteristics (once indirectly, via ADA) and consequently makes all the other coefficients less significant than expected. Thus, such a measure poses a number of difficulties of interpretation for the researcher.
Recently, Kalt (1982) Kalt was on to the problem. Indeed, he found ideology to be by far the most important variable in the determination of PROCRUDE (1981, pp. 265-268) . The problem is not, however, a simultaneous determination of PROCRUDE and PRO-ADA with PROADA being a determinant of PROCRUDE. Rather we conjecture there are underlying factors which are the major determinants of both PROCRUDE and PROADA. Kalt can be defended for his procedure since he regressed PROADA on party and the socioeconomic characteristics of the district and realized that PROADA was largely determined by those factors (1981, p. 266 ). Kalt, who did not conceptualize PROADA as personal ideology (1981, p. 260) did not probe the linkage further. Matthews (1960, pp. 133-135) may have been the first to have sophisticated thoughts about how to rectify these sorts of problems, although he did so with an eye to party loyalty, not ideology. As MacRae (1970, p. 253) 
puts it:
This leads MacRae to conclude (p. 253), "Matthews's reasoning suggests a line of investigation which still remains promising."
Most recently, Kau and Rubin (1979a) and Johannes and McAdams (1981) have built on Ridker and Henning (1967) We shall argue below that with some changes the residualization technique is a useful, standardizable, approach to the problem. We shall apply it to a study of labor votes in the Senate to illustrate its general properties. Note that part of the difficulty with the original measures stems from the non-observable (directly) nature of the personally held values segment of the representative's ideology. What is needed is a proxy for this nonobservable segment of ideology, i.e., personal i d e~l o g y .To understand how personal ideology
The American Politic can be measured by the residualization technique, we need to see how using the "residualized" ADA works.
A Residualized Measure of Ideology
To develop our analysis, consider a representative's vote (Q on any issue ( i ) or group of indexed issues and represent it as a function of party membership (P), district interests (D), legislative position (LP), campaign contributions (C), and personal ideology (1):1° Since I is inherently unobservable, researchers have typically used a proxy variable-frequently the representative's ADA rating.ll ADA is, however, based on a set of votes and hence is a special case of equation (1). Let us represent that set of votes contained in ADA as VA; now the typical estimated determinants of the voting equation is
The problem with this representation is obvious. Trying to estimate a vote as a function of another vote produces a situation where none of the coefficients obtained is interpretable. This problem is not solved by using the ADA rating from another year, nor by purging the ADA index of certain votes, since membership, district interests, and personal ideology should be fairly stable over time."
If we grant that an incumbent politico cannot be expected to answer ideological questions in any but a strategic manner, and hence a manner that reflects the political constraints that (s)he is locampaign contributions consist of more than money; they include goods, services, and time, all of which are substitutes over some relevant range.
"Again, recall how closely related are all the scores of these "ideological" groups (see note 7).
"Normally, the use of ADA scores in these studies is modified so as to take out of the votes used in constructing the ADA index those elements that are also part of the votes being explained (so that one is not explaining something by itself). Researchers have in general been careful to take out those votes that they are trying to explain from those that are used by the group in the construction of the ratings. See, for example, Lopreato and Smoller (1978) and Bernstein and Horn (1981) . Kau and Rubin (1979a) carry this one step further. They use ADA (residualized) of One year to explain voting in a second year. This practice does nothing to solve the problem we discuss here, unless the following assump tion holds: the error terms between years are uncorrelated. We make this assumption explicit.
a1 Science Review Vol. 78 under, there is no independent way to estimate the effect of personal ideology on Q.However, if we are willing to accept a "stricter" definition of personal ideology, it is possible to derive an acceptable proxy. To see this, consider the redefined relationship 6 = fXP*, D*, LP*, c*, I*)
where P * is now party membership plus that part of the personal ideological structure of the individual representative which is correlated with P.
D * is the district interests plus that part of Iwhich was correlated with D; LP* are the constraints from legislative position, plus that part of Iwhich was correlated with LP; C* is the direct effect of campaign contributions plus the effect of campaign contributions through I; and I * is that part of I which was uncorrelated (or orthogonal) with party, legislative position, campaign contributions. and district interests. This new definition of I * can be said to be equivalent to the representative's ideological deviation from those ideological interests of party, legislature, campaign contributions, and district." That is, to estimate I * we "residualize" ADA. Ignoring L P and C (so as to minimize confusion) for the remainder of this section, let us define a particular linear specification of equation (3) as:14 where q is a pure white noise term distributed with zero mean and a scalar covariance matrix. Now, if we were to estimate this equation without I*, we would get where oi= d31* + el. Note that when I* is omitted &*, absorbs the mean value of I*.'' There is a problem, since P * and D * are unobservable. Equation (5) is, however, equivalent to because of the orthogonality conditions imposed between I*and P, D and el. As Kau and Rubin (1979a) put it, "The coefficients . . . are the same "The tie between this notion and that developed by Kau and Rubin (1979a, pp. 368-372) and Johannes and McAdams (1981) should be obvious.
"The argument is considerably more complex in detail, but not substance, for many common nonlinear specifications of the equations.
"Thus, I*can be redefined as being centered around 0.
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Estimating the Personal Ideology of Political Representatives 167 as they would have been had ADA not been included" (p. 370). Taking the expectation of the observed residual term Oi in equation (6):
Thus, the residuals from equation (6) contain an unbiased estimate of I * scaled by a3.I6 (Since the scale of I * is unknown, it is of no consequence that a3 is unknown.) Our three newly defined variables have new interpretations, as indicated above. For a*lP* and a*2D* incorporate the direct effects of party and the indirect effects of ideology ( I ) which work through P and D respectively, whereas a g * re~resents onlv the direct effects of ~ersonal idkology: independent of P and D.I7 T& reader should be careful to note that since a1 and a2 are estimates of the direct plus the indirect effects, they are biased estimates of the direct effects. l 8
But there still are problems with using the residuals from equation (6) as a proxy for I*. First, even though the expectation of every eg is zero, it gives us little comfort that this is true on average. There is no reason to believe that the error term associated with any particular representative, in any particular year, will be zero. If we take just one measurement of our residualized ADA, we cannot tell what is being measured: noise or ideology! We ought to develop a means of estimating the relative magnitude of I*to ei in oi.To understand this problem, recall that we wish to extract a measure of the representative's personal ideology which we can utilize as an explanatory variable concerning other issues. Imagine that we extract our measure, enter it into a second equation (to explain some other votes), and discover that the coefficients on the residuals from equation (6), suggested here as our proxy for personal ideology, is not significant in the second equation. There are two possible reasons: the residuals from equation (6) did not contain a systematic component (i.e., I*), or I * was not a determinate of the particular issue.19 Now of course it is preferable to be I6In essence, this is what lay behind the Kau and Rubin (1979a) "residualized" variable, RADA.
"Note the analogy between these interpretations and path analysis.
IBIt is not possible to solve for the coefficients of the direct effects without making assumptions about the covariance between I, P, and D.
I9Note that this is a real possibility. Consider, for example, the findings of Chappell(1981a) that ideology did not effect voting on cargo bills. able to identify which of these two things is going on in the data. If one does not do this, it is difficult to identify in which of the issues ideology does play a part.20 Thus, our first problem is to find a method to tell us if we have a systematic component in our residuals. To do this, we must discover what is in the residual. We then may be able to use this information to understand better the behavior of representative^.^^
To sketch the justification of our solutions to these questions, we shall expose the technical roots of our argument. These roots permit identifying the assumptions necessary to justify using the residuals to measure the nonobservable variable. The discussion shall also permit us to interpret our results.22 *Mae'ix the *pproach Chamberlain (1977) has developed a sophisticated analysis of the "residualization" method of dealing with unobserved variables in a simultaneous equation framework. His model, "assumes that the common left out variable is the only thing connecting the residuals from these equations, making it possible to extract this common factor and control for it" (p. 241). Quite clearly, this is our problem. We estimate a restricted version of Chamberlain's "model 1" and develop our technique within his framework (cf. Chamberlain's model 1, 1977, pp. 243-245, 248-250) . Here we shall be careful to distinguish between restrictions we make to identify and apply Chamberlain's model and to simplify our presentation.
To begin, consider three variants of equation (4): ' OOf course if a significant coefficient is obtained as in most of Kau and Rubin's (1979a) cases, it is safe to assume that the residuals contained I*and that I* was a determinant of the issue being examined.
21Assume, for the moment, that we solve this problem. It could still be that in Oi, eiis very large relative to I*. Then, Oiwould be primarily random noise. In such an extreme, a representative may either have no personal ideology or may have one which does not deviate from the ideological interests of party and district. We shall not be able to differentiate well between these two possibilities, in part because of our utilization of a measure of ideology which is "purged" of indirect effects. "Those who are not interested in the technicalities may skip this and other subsection(s) marked with asterisks.
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It will greatly simplify the exposition without affecting the analysis or results if we assume that the constant terms (ao, bo, and go) and the coefficients of P (al, bl, gl) , are zero. Now let us write equation (8) in the standard simultaneous equation framework, TY = B X + W. Here, For Chamberlain's model 1, it is necessary to make restrictions on the T matrix and the error covariance matrix, W, which we shall define s h~r t l y .~' Chamberlain requires T to be upper triangular (or equivalently, lower triangular) and to make enough restrictions on the other elements of T and W to identify the system of equations.
Here, we make the most restrictive assumption about T, that it is a diagonal matrix (i.e., all of the nondiagonal elements are zero). This is equivalent to saying that the vote on one issue does not affect a vote on another issue and implies that a vote on an issue does not affect district interests or personal ideology. These restrictions are unnecessary and they are testable.14 Next, we turn to the B matrix and thexvector. Note again, I is not observable." Rewriting equation (9) to take 1's nonobservable nature into account we have:
As noted earlier, however, this is equivalent to 2yChamberlain's other models are developed for cases where alternative types of assumptions might be more appropriate. His model 2 requires restrictions on B and W. His model 3 requires restrictions on T and B as well as W.
'Wne could utilize a simultaneous equation model, similar to those of Kau, Keenan, and Rubin (1982) and Chappell (1981a) to test these assumptions, within our framework. We shall not do this here, however. P ' Z = 1' + I*where the orthogonal decomposition desired is such that cov (11,0) # 0 and cov (I*,D) = 0. Either II or I * or both may be zero vectors. We make the further standard assumption that I is nonstochastic and hence uncorrelated with the stochastic error terms el, e2, and e3. and d*2, 6*2, are the estimated coefficients which would exist if D* were the only independent variable.16 The formulas given by Chamberlain (1977, p. 245) may be used to solve for a3, b3, and g3. In our case, we are only interested in one coefficient for I*, say g3. With the restriction we have imposed on the T and W matrices, we no longer have a truly simultaneous equation system, although it does no harm to estimate it as one.
Stage 1. Obtaining I*from the Residuals to Apply to a Second Stage
A shortcut allows us to answer the questions we posed earlier about using the residuals as an estimator for I*: "What is in the residuals?" If two or more equations are available, a simple test of the relative magnitudes of the variance of the random error terms is available." To see this, we must first estimate the equations and obtain th_e residuals, oi.Do this for two equations so that UI = &I* + el and 0 2 = E31* + e2.
What happens if-_we calc_ulate the correlation coefficient between Ul and U2?28 At the extremes, obviouslv if r = 0, I * is a constant (and hence does not explain differences in voting patterns), and if r = 1, el and ez have zero variances, and the observed residuals are composed of only I*.19
How large r must be in order for the residuals to 26Recall that D* = (D + I*). Note also that equation (11) is now estimatable as a system of Zellner seemingly unrelated regression equations, and no additional restrictions (given our 7)are needed. It makes our situation much easier, however, if we restrict the covariances of ele2, elej, and eg3 to be zero. Given these assump tions, the expectation of error covariance matrix can be calculated, as can the coefficients of I* when regressed against ADA. "This test depends on our assumption that the error terms are not correlated across equations (see note 12). u1and 0 2 may be seen as instrumental variables for I*.
"Note that if there are more than two equations, it is possible to add the residuals together and average them first in order to perform the test.
29This approach also could be applied to calculate the correlation of the coefficients of I * in the observed residuals (if they were to be used as an independent variable in a second stage of a multi-stage model) and also to an estimate of the ratio of a3 to b3. Chamberlain, 1977, pp. 249-250) . If we had a large number of equations from which to take the observed residuals, it would be reasonable to assume that the sum of the error terms would be zero for all representatives. This is analogous to the test-retest concept familiar in the psychological literature where the observed test score is equal to the true test score plus a random error term that cancels out in repeated testing. Thus, the more equations from which the residuals are obtained, the more reasonable the assumption that the error sum equals zero. We shall later measure the personal ideological variable (over the decade of the 1970s) and, assuming it to remain stable, utilize an averaging process to get a measure which minimizes the effects of single outliers and increases the likelihood of the error terms as summing to zero for all observations.
Summary of Stage 1
Thus, we can again summarize the assumptions that are required for this approach to make sense:
1. "The common left-out variable is the only thing connecting the residuals from these equations, making it possible to extract this common factor and control for it." (p. 241, Chamber-2. Tis upper triangular (or, equivalently, lower triangular), and T and Ware restricted enough to identify the system of equations.
Here, we made the most restrictive assumption about T: that it is a diagonal matrix (i.e., all of the nondiagonal elements are zero). This is ' OIn our discussion above, regarding r, we implicitly assumed that a3 and b3 were nonzero and that their sum was nonzero. The necessity of making these assumptions suggests that we need two or more equations where the absolute values of a3 and b3 are as large as possible, relative to their standard errors, and that it is better if a3 and b3 be of the same sign so there is no chance of their cancelling out.
"Of course, any variable which is not explicitly entered into the equations to explain ADA could account for the statistical results we report here. It is our belief that any critic's suggestion that the residual really represents another variable must be taken seriously. It is also our belief that the burden of proof is the critic's. Now how are we to proceed? We wanted to estimate I, an unobservable. The best we can do is to estimate I*, which is the ideological variable, stripped of its "indirect" effects. To find I* we residualize ADA. Beyond this, we must estimate the relative contents of the residual term: How much is noise and how much is I*? To do this we: First, choose two or more equations where the absolute values of a3 and b3 are likely to be large. The most likely candidates are those equations where I.;. is an ideological vote or group of votes. Second, we choose two or more equations with similar dependent and independent variables. If most variables are stable over time, estimating the same equation in two or more different time periods immediately suggests itself. We will shortly utilize both of these criteria in developing our research design to probe I*, but we first summarize the procedure.
1. Take two or more iterations of the same theoretical model such that I is the only unobserved variable.
2. Perform r, or R2,test to identify the relative magnitude of the variance that one can ascribe to I*and to the random error terms.
3. Obtain the observed residuals from these equations and average them. In what follows, it is important to recall a few important points made earlier.
The constant term absorbs the mean value of I*.
The coefficients of other independent variables are the unbiased estimates of the direct effects plus the indirect effects of I, but are biased estimators of the direct effects. Therefore, the estimated variances of the coefficients are positively biased estimates of the true variance of the direct plus indirect effects of I, which implies that the t-test is more conservative than the indicated level of significance. The estimated variances of the coefficients are biased (in an unknown direction) estimates of the true variance of the direct effect coefficients.
If I * has a significant coefficient, then personal ideology has an effect. The opposite result is more difficult to interpret since it may occur because I has no direct effect after being purged of its correlation with other included variables. Hence our test is extremely strict and will have a low power in rejecting the null hypothesis (i.e., that personal
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An Illustrative Application of the Residualization Technique
Let us apply our method for the extraction of a measure of the direct effects of personal ideology, I*. To identify I * we select a set of votes and identify what is left unexplained by the legislator's party, district, and legislative position. Using ADA votes as a simple indicator for overall manifest ideology, we "explain" those votes by a set of political constraints and personal political values. Consider a simple expansion of our linear specification of the model (equation 3) above3= ADA = Bo + B*iP* + B*2D* If our hypothesis is correct, the observed residual term (in the brackets) contains personal ideology as well as a random error term. As indicated above, that term does not readily permit interpretation because it does not provide a means of separating out the two components and because the error term can not be expected to be zero for any single observation. So now let us specify the same equation for two different (perhaps multiyear) time periods (see equations 13a and b), t and t-l.33 "Note that we have dropped campaign contributions from our specification of equation (12), owing to the unavailability of detailed campaign contribution data necessary for much of the time period c~vered by the data we utilize in the next sections. For later years it is available (see Kau et al., 1982 , for a sophisticated treatment of 1979 votes and 1978 campaign contributions by groups). Our omission of campaign contributions is mitigated to some extent by the large number of district characteristics we include in our empirical specification. To the extent that campaign contributions are proportional to the strength of included variables, their effects will be absorbed by those coefficients. We would hypothesize two routes for the effects of campaign contributions on ideology: first, a general indirect "purchase" of ideology and second, a general "purchase" of particular votes. The first route is testable by calculating the correlation coefficient between our estimated measure of ideology and contributions, and the second route by entering contributions directly as an independent variable in a regression on the determinants of those votes. Not surprisingly, preliminary research with campaign contributions from later years indicates the second route to be much more important than the first.
"In practice, two-year periods are congressional sessions and represent the longest time period that the researcher can be assured of the same representatives Our measure, I*, can now be developed as follows. We have two equations where I* appears in the residual term. From equation (12) and the above discussion, consider the following equations:
where t and t-1 will represent even and odd years respectively for our purposes. This is a recursive simultaneous equation system which can be estimated with OLS or GLS, as appr~priate.~' I * can now be consistently estimated by regressing (Ad* + et) on (Bd* + et-1) which becomes:
or alternatively:
Note that we have now defined two measures of I*: and both of which are consistent estimators of I*. Since we have no knowledge of which one is the most efficient consistent estimator of I*, we minimize the risk of a wrong choice and allow for counterbalancing error terms by averaging and I*2: Now let us turn to an empirical estimation of the model we proposed above. Estimation of voting models requires the use of qualitative serving together. If the coefficients across different congressional sessions are assumed to be stable, different sessions may be "stacked," exploiting the large number of degrees of freedom. We have made this assumption; it is not necessary.
34Although we have assumed the independent variables in both equations to be the same, this is not necessary for our argument. Indeed, one could imagine that in the United States the functional relationship would be different even (election) years and odd (off) years.
limited dependent variable techniques, maximum likelihood probit or logit for single votes and for voting indices, generalized least squares (GLS) with a probit or logit transformation of the dependent variable to correct for known statistical problems with ordinary least squares regression model (Hanushek & Jackson, 1977) . We have used the GLS probit (Judge et al., 1980 (Judge et al., , 1982 because of the desirability of probit's normal error term assumption." The necessary GLS weights, however, create a problem that has not been dealt with earlier: the unweighted residuals from equations (13a) and (13b) need not have a zero mean and may be correlated with the independent variables in those equations. We need to insure the zero mean and the lack of correlation between I* and the original set of independent variables so as to allow future weighting of these variables (via probit, etc.) to be interpretable; that is, the unweighted form (rather than the form generated qfter a probit transform and weights) of the residualized variables must be uncorrelated with the other independent variables. Thus, to use I* in equation (16), it is necessary to regress the unweighted residuals of equations (13a) and (13b) against the unweighted independent variables in those equations. (Table 1 reports the regression equations for equations (13a) and (13b).) One can then use the resulting residuals as the measures in equations (15a) and (15b).'$ Tables 1,2 , and 3 report the results of an application of the proposed technique to the measure ment of the ideology of U.S. senators during the 1970s. In Table 1 we have regressed many state characteristics against each senator's annual ADA rating, to identify the residual. (This is in direct contrast with Johannes and McAdams, 1981, p. 517 , who regress ADA only with the 1972 McGovern vote.) Personal ideology, by hypothesis, is in this residual. In this procedure we have taken what could be described as a kitchen-sink approach to estimating the ADA equation. In general this is an unacceptable practice because the multicollinearity can be so high that little or nothing can be said about the influence and significance of any of the coefficients. However, our purpose here is simply to minimize the sum of squares of the residuals and to guard against leav-"The choice between probit and logit is, however, arbitrary for most applications. In either case it is necessary to use a correction factor to prevent exact zeros and ones which are undefined. We used the one suggested by Lindgren and McElrath (1969) .
36The result of these two auxiliary regressions are not reported here but are available from the authors. The correlation between the two versions of the residuals is approximately .9 for even, and .8 for odd, years.
ing out any significant systematic factors which would otherwise become a part of our estimated I*." Therefore, in this case, no harm is done by this eclectic approach.
We ask the reader to forgive us: we feel that we must indulge ourselves with an interpretation of the above results which has nothing to do with the main thrust of this article. Consider the coefficients on the DELECT and RELECT variables. They appear to be indicating something quite important. It appears, from their sign and size and significance that we can conclude that first, pressures for reelection affect primarily voting in the odd calendar years. Thus it appears that the incumbent campaigns on his previous year's record. Further, and this is of some theoretical importance, the Democrats are pushed to the right, and the Republicans to the left, by the elections. If you wish, during odd years they seem to converge (toward some median voter?) whereas during even years (when their votes are perhaps too close in time to be fully digested and considered by the interested public for the election), the parties are further apart and driven more by their natural coalition members. This observation would indicate that any model of party behavior should combine the median voter analysis of Downs along with the coalitional analysis of those cited in note 4 above.
The above regressions leave residuals that (after correcting for the GLS weights), we conjecture to be personal ideology. If our conjecture is correct, these residuals should be related, and we can check the validity of our measure by regressing the residuals of the odd years against the residuals of the even years. Doing this would lead us to expect a sizable correlation between the two sets of years (the larger the correlation, the more stable, and the larger the I* component in the resid~als).~' We report this test in Table 2 . These results show that the observed unweighted, corrected, residuals share a common variance of 36% of their variance.
Yet another test suggests itself, if B41*1 = 0, or the average of the two residuals (i.e., if people have no personal ideology as measured or if I * "One could emphasize further the coalitional aspects of the relationship between constituents and voting in the legislature. To do this, one could enter each of the district characteristics twice: once modified by a dummy variable representing party. Such a model would perhaps better represent the works indicated in note 4 above.
'@The formula for the correlation coefficient clearly shows what is happening, given our assumptions:
The American Political Science Review Vol. 78 1970-1982, except (1) the figures on the membership in the interest groups (Common Cause, the environmental groups, and the AFL-CIO) which were obtained directly from the groups involved and (2) the energy production figures which came from Shreck (1977) , pp. 940,1081, and 397. b~e r e the actual dependent variable is the PROBIT transformation of the ADA evaluation. See note 35. 
a2= -36
plays no role in determining ADA), then adding the observed residual to the equation for the t -1 time period as an independent variable should not greatly effect the explanatory power of the equation. After all, adding the residual would merely be adding a random error term. On the other hand, if it does contain personal ideology, then it will significantly increase the overall explanatory power of the time period t regression.
Performing this test supports our conjecture. We considered the set of senators and their ADA ratings in even and odd years.39 We found that we could explain 54% ( R~) of the variance of ADA in odd years using D, LP, and P, and 64% (R2) of the variance when augmenting those variables with the even years' residuals. Similarly, in even years, the figures are 57% and 68%, for gains in both data sets of a bit more than 10%.
With these strong results, we continue with our investigation. Are the residuals a sensible indicator of the senators' ideologies? To see this we transform the residuals onto a scale from -1 (conservative) to + 1 (liberal). These techniques are utilized to calculate I* for members of the Senate in 1979 and 1980, and the results are reported in the next table (Table 3) . Although here we perform no statistical checks on these results, one is able to ask whether the results are intuitively plausible.
Our intuition is not fully satisfied with these results. A close examination shows, for example, there are a number of peculiar rankings that must be mentioned. But first, note that we are not accustomed to think of the representative's ideology in this fashion, and hence there are bound to be some seemingly anomalous results. The causes for these anomalies should perhaps be discussed. Putting this aside as nontrivial, and yet not quite to the point, other obvious causes for anomalies 39By beginning with an odd year, the ADA rating is not affected by the defeat of an incumbent in an election during the period examined. indicated at various points above, there is no attempt to take into account the specifically coalitional constraints upon the representatives; that is, we have not tried to develop a model that takes into account the specific local array of interest groups supporting each of the senators. The only time we even approximated this, by considering southern Republicans as separate from other Republicans, we found that they tended to differ from other Republicans. Southern Republicanism was tied (weakly, to be sure) to a more liberal record. Presumably, some of the variance would be explained by such a variable. Finally, there has been no attempt to introduce the financial constituents, or backers, of the representatives, as a further constraint to their voting behavior. Were we to follow up on these last two points, the ratings could change quite substantially. But there would still be an unexplained pattern to the anomalies: southern Democrats who were not very conservative now appear, by our measure, to be quite liberal. (See, for example, Hollings of South Carolina.) On the other hand, liberal Republicans are given quite a boost for their bucking of the (negative) ideological correlation between Republicanism and the ADA. For examples, note Leahy of Vermont and Weicker of Connecticut. By permitting a coalitional variable to be included, some of the anomalous weightings for nonconservative southern Democrats and liberal northern Republicans could well be mitigated, but probably not all. Recall that we are not used to thinking about ideology this way, partially 
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because I* is that segment of ideology which is independent of party. A reexamination of Table 1 helps to illuminate the issue. Not surprisingly, party and region are extremely important constraints of ADA. Hence bucking these political constraints yields large residuals or I*. Recall the problem: we wish to explain a subset (other than ADA) of the ith iegislator's voting record. The general paradigm for the analysis of legislative voting is illustrated in Figure 1 Finally, let us see the effect of utilizing both our measure of ideology and the "standard" measure. To do this, we report the findings of a preliminary As indicated above, although this is generally attempt to explain (or predict) voting on issues of estimated as V = g(P, D, LP, C, ADA), where concern to organized l a b~r .~' Here we utilize the ADA is used a proxy for the hard to measure I, we evaluation, or rating, of the senators by the AFLhave developed an alternative residualized I*. CIO (i.e., their COPE scores) as the dependent Thus, we conjecture: variable and develop two models (see Table 4 ). In one we utilize our measure of ideology (I*) and in V(s) = h (P*, D*, LP*, C*, I*) (18) the other we utilize the traditional ADA measure.
Now the structure of equation (18) Durden, 1976) . Interested readers may also wish to effects. Further, recall that we have a measure of obtain ideological ratings which take into account some ideology which is "purged" of indirect effects (on coalitional characteristics as well as ratings for members ADA).
of the House. These can be obtained from the authors. (Oppenheimer, Mitchell, & Carson, in press ). The parallel results there form an interesting contrast. I* there is far more effective as an explanatory variable than it is in explaining COPE scores. Using party and the percentage of the state population who are members of environmental groups along with ideology, we found I* increased R2from .16 to 24. Further, it yielded an equation which quite sensibly indicated that all three variables were highly significant (with 479 degrees of freedom, t was above 7 for all coefficients). This was in contrast to the results when ADA was used instead of I*. ADA, as a surrogate for all the socioeconomic and political characteristics of the state yielded a very improved R2(31). But it so distorted the weights that party's coefficient was significant only at a .07level. Here again, one can reintroduce the demographic and economic characteristics of the state, with I*, and without fear that the correlation with I* will lead to difficulties of interpretation.
Conclusions
We have developed a procedure for extracting a politician's ideological leaning, relative to his or her political environment, which may be interpreted in various ways. If the electoral environment is defined strictly as the politician's electorate, it can be thought of as a deviation from the electoral unit from which he or she is elected, as conceived of by Johannes and McAdams (1981) . But if we define the political environment more broadly, there are many possible interpretations of this variable. It could be personal ideology, or purchased positions by forces outside of the incumbent's electorate, or positions taken for national political considerations (e.g., to go along with the presidency), depending upon which variables are brought to bear. All of these interpretations can be tested in their own right. But that would constitute a further article (see Oppenheimer, Mitchell, & Carson, in press ). Any of these interpretations would make some politicians who have liberal records look conservative, namely those politicians who score high on ADA ratings, but come from even more liberal electorates. Similarly, some politicians from conservative districts, with less conservative records, will appear liberal. Hence, this method is likely to stretch the theoretical understanding and conceptualization of ideology which we hold.
Let us review the assumptions underlying this technique. First, we assume that the residuals (for example, as calculated in Table 1 above) contain only a random error term and our I* variable. This is a rebuttable presumption. But at this point in time, the burden of proof seems to be on the critic. After all, any variable conjectured to be contained in the residual can be tested for, and the new residual calculated to examine its nature. Thus, the general technique does not require that we have correctly isolated I* at this point. Second, we assume that each individual's personal ideology is stable. This requirement is endemic to the procedure, as is the assumption that the actual error terms are uncorrelated over time (and therefore that their correlation is an artifact of the other variable, I*, contained in the residual). These assumptions permit the developmment of an alternative measure for ideology which yields a number of benefits including an ability to assess, realistically, the relative importance of the various factors determining a legislator's vote.
The technique has other practical significance. It would permit, for example, interest groups to assess which incumbents are "friendly" and ought to be supported. Rather than identifying those with the highest ADA rating as the most liberal, we now identify those who go furthest to the left of their constituents as the most liberal. This permits us to relativize the voting of the legislators to their constituency and their pressures. Hence we see who is most likely to go out on a limb because of personal political feelings. Similar work could be done for other interest group scores.
